而不同的公共部门存在着不同的权力分配关系，在不同的权力结构下，委托人与代理人可能出现的道德风险问题也会有所不同。
For different distribution relation of power in different public sector there are various problems of moral risk of trustor and agent in various power structure.
本文从信息博弈角度出发，分析信息在企业内流动与企业委托人与代理人的激励关系。
This article proceed from information game, to analyse the information flow in enterprise and the incentive relation between trustor and agent.
股票期权制度作为一种长期激励机制，是解决由于所有权与经营权分离所引起的委托人与代理人之间利益冲突的有效机制，但在实践中也存在着诸多的弊端。
Stock option as a long-term inspiration mechanism, is proved to be a effective mechanism to solve conflicts between consigner and attorney that arose from separation of management and possession.
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