而不同的公共部门存在着不同的权力分配关系，在不同的权力结构下，委托人与代理人可能出现的道德风险问题也会有所不同。
For different distribution relation of power in different public sector there are various problems of moral risk of trustor and agent in various power structure.
本文从信息博弈角度出发，分析信息在企业内流动与企业委托人与代理人的激励关系。
This article proceed from information game, to analyse the information flow in enterprise and the incentive relation between trustor and agent.
代理人凭自己的实力与委托人谈判，代理合同是双方博弈的均衡结果。
Agent negotiates with the client by his power, and the agent contract is the result of the game equilibrium of the two sides.
股票期权制度作为一种长期激励机制，是解决由于所有权与经营权分离所引起的委托人与代理人之间利益冲突的有效机制，但在实践中也存在着诸多的弊端。
Stock option as a long-term inspiration mechanism, is proved to be a effective mechanism to solve conflicts between consigner and attorney that arose from separation of management and possession.
根据委托—代理理论，由于委托人与代理人目标函数不完全一致以及信息不对称，会产生代理问题。
According to the principal-agent theory, the different target functions and unsymmetrical information of the principals and agents will give rise to the problem of agent.
棘轮效应是委托代理关系中委托人与代理人追求目标发生冲突时产生的一种现象。
The ratchet effect is a phenomenon induced in conflict between entruster and agent who pursue different objectives in the entrustment-agency relation.
双方之间实质上是掌握信息较多的代理人通过合同或其他经济关系与掌握信息较少的委托人之间的博弈关系。
In essence, the relationship between them is to play a game by contract or other economic restrain like agent and client.
现代公司表现为所有者与经营者分析的委托—代理关系，委托人既要恰当地激励代理人，又要对代理人的行为进行监管。
One feature of modern enterprises is the separated relationship between principals and agencies, which requires that principals should give proper incentives and supervisions to agencies.
本文主要思想来源于委托-代理模型，用于解决委托人与代理人由于信息不对称而引发的道德风险问题。
The main thought of this article stems from principal-agent model which had been used for solving moral hazard problems because of information asymmetry between principal and agent.
现代企业最突出的特征是企业所有权与经营权的分离。所有权与经营权的分离带来了委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突。
For modern enterprises, separation of ownership and control is one outstanding characteristic, which brings about interest conflicts between finance and management.
委托代理关系中，由于信息不对称、委托人与代理人目标函数不一致等原因产生代理问题。
In principal-agent relations, principal-agent problems occur because of information asymmetry and discrepancies between the objective functions of the principal and the agent.
委托代理关系中，由于信息不对称、委托人与代理人目标函数不一致等原因产生代理问题。
In principal-agent relations, principal-agent problems occur because of information asymmetry and discrepancies between the objective functions of the principal and the agent.
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