Opaque as CDSs may be, they are less complex than CDOs.
或许CDSs不太透明，但它们并不比CDOs复杂。
CDSs are not the only members of the derivatives hall of shame.
信用违约掉期并非金融衍生品耻辱柱上的唯一成员。
CDSs are powerful corrective instruments that discipline Banks.
CDS是促使银行恪守规则的强有力的纠正工具。
There are, for instance, already plans for clearing houses for CDSs.
例如，已经有计划为信用违约互换提供结算场所。
Sovereign CDSs are in any case harder to interpret than corporate CDSs.
主权信用违约掉期在任何情况下都比公司信用违约掉期更加难以解读。
Until last year credit-default swaps (CDSs) were hailed as a wonder of modern finance.
直到去年，作为一个现代金融奇迹，信贷违约掉期(CDSs)还在接受欢呼。
The cause of this turn of events is the proliferation of CDSs on the company’s debt.
这轮事件的原因是由于公司债上的信用违约互换的扩张。
Speculators anticipate a sovereign default and speculate in this direction via CDSs.
投机者预期主权违约，通过CDS进行违约投机。
But it will also be a test for the dauntingly large market for credit-default swaps (CDSs).
然而这对于令人望而却步的信用违约互换(CDSs)巨大市场来说也是个检验。
CDSs are not weapons of mass destruction but instruments of providing discipline and order.
CDS不是大规模杀伤性金融武器，而是提供纪律和秩序的工具。
That means some buyers of CDSs, who were betting on default, may paradoxically end up worse off.
这意味着某些押宝在信用违约互换违约的买家将最终承受更多损失。
From almost nothing just a few years ago, CDSs grew at an explosive rate until recently (see chart 2).
CDS这个几年前不存在的东西，爆炸性成长直到最近(见图2)。
That is because a default would trigger the bond-insurance contracts called credit-default swaps (CDSs).
这是因为违约就会触发人称信贷违约交换credit - default swaps (CDSs)的国库券保险合同。
They include Banks and hedge funds that have acquired credit-default swaps (CDSS), the cornerstone of the market.
他们中包括购买了作为市场基石的信用违约互换(CDSs)的银行和对冲基金。
And a third was to cut the risk of borrowers defaulting, using CDSs with insurers like American International Group.
第三种是将借款人违约风险切除，即通过如美国国际集团之类的保险公司担保CDS。
Once considered a marvellous tool of risk management, CDSs now look as though they will magnify, not mitigate, risk.
一度被视为控制风险的神奇工具的信用违约互换，现在则像是在扩大，而不是减小风险。
Perhaps, argues Tim Bond, a market strategist at Barclays Capital, the falling cost of CDSs is a harbinger of things to come.
也许有人可以做出解释。英国巴克莱银行的市场战略专家TimBond称，信用违约互换的价格滑落，正预示着有事情发生。
More febrile still has been the popularity of new fangled derivatives with difficult names, such as creditdefault swaps (CDSs).
对那些新创造的有很难的名字的衍生工具如不偿还贷款业务互换，人们已经开始对其进行热烈追捧。
As defaults soar, it is one of the first big firms to have its restructuring complicated by holders of credit-default swaps (CDSs).
随着违约剧增，它是公司的重组被信用违约互换持有人搞复杂了的最初的公司之一。
Financial eggheads used them as building blocks in "synthetic" CDO-type structures, which are based on CDSs rather than actual bonds.
金融精英们以它们作为积木，“合成”CDO - type大厦，基础却是CDSs而非真实的债权。
Unsecured creditors who hold CDSs might prefer default to a lengthy restructuring: to them, the insurance policy is worth more than the house.
拥有信用违约互换的无担保的债权人宁愿看到违约也不想看到漫长的重组：对他们来说，保险单比房屋更值钱。
Sovereign CDSs also tend be priced in dollars-except for swaps on America's debt, which are priced in euros-so currency risk blurs things too.
主权信用违约掉期通常用美元计价(美国债务的信用掉期除外，为欧元计价)。所以，外汇风险的加入会把情况搞得更加复杂。
There is broad agreement that “standardised” CDSs should go through a central clearing house, in order to reduce systemic risk when counterparties fail.
一个被广泛接受的共识是，“规范化”的信贷违约掉期应当通过中央结算系统降低风险转移失败所可能带来的系统风险。
That is true, but this implausibly large "voluntary" writedown will lead investors in other European sovereign bonds to doubt whether CDSs offer much protection.
情况确实如此，但这一大得令人难以置信的“自愿”减免将让其他欧洲国家的主权国库券投资者怀疑CDSs没有提供多大的保护。
Such concerns are mirrored in the prices of credit-default swaps (CDSs), a type of insurance against bankruptcy, which have risen to alarming levels for all six firms.
这些忧虑从信用违约互换(CDSs)——一种防止破产的保险产品可以看出，这六家公司的这些产品都已激增到令人瞠目结舌的程度。
Another way of looking at credit risk is by comparing the LIBOR spread with the premiums charged on Banks' credit-default swaps (CDSs), which measure the risk of default.
另一个观察信用风险的途径：比较伦敦同业拆借率较银行信用违约互换升水的情况，信用违约互换是衡量违约的工具。
After a crisis investors (and for that matter regulators) seldom make exactly the same mistake twice. There are, for instance, already plans for clearing houses for CDSs.
风险投资者(在那个例子中就是立法者)很少犯两次相同的错误，现在已经有完备的方案来清理房市的信用违约交换。
After a crisis investors (and for that matter regulators) seldom make exactly the same mistake twice. There are, for instance, already plans for clearing houses for CDSs.
风险投资者(在那个例子中就是立法者)很少犯两次相同的错误，现在已经有完备的方案来清理房市的信用违约交换。
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