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"On Flanders Field in World War I, She got a big hole from a Bertha Gun, She turned blood red in World War II She hung limp, and low, a time or two.
VOA: special.2010.07.02
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French universities are named very poetically, Paris I,II,III,IV,V,VI, all the way through XIV, which is a real hole, or XIII is probably the worst.
巴黎的大学命名得都很有诗意,巴黎第一大学,第二大学,第三大学,以此类推,一直到第十四大学,这是真实存在的,第十三大学可能是最差的
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If Player II is playing S2*, Player I will want to play S1* since that's his best response.
如果参与人II选择S2,参与人I就会选最佳对策S1
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If you go onto the continent,though, they tended to be interrupted by World War I and World War II.
如果你们往欧洲大陆国家那里考虑,一战和二战期间的数据几乎是没有存档的
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I once went to visit the summer palace that he created and that Nicholas II loved so much there.
我曾到过他修建的夏宫看过,据说尼古拉二世特别喜欢那个地方
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Two of the key players there are Frank Speizer, a physician who got the study started, The Nurses' Health Study I, that got started in 1976, and then Walter Willett who got Nurses' Health Study II started, and is still the principle investigator of these studies.
弗兰克.斯佩萨是两名关键成员之一,就是这位内科医生提出进行 这项研究,第一阶段护士健康研究开始于1976年,另一位主要成员是沃尔特·威莱特,他开始了第二阶段的护士健康研究,他还是这些研究的理论调查者
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So Allen is saying if Player I is choosing this strategy and Player II is choosing her corresponding strategy here, neither player has an incentive to deviate.
艾伦认为如果参与人I采取这个策略,而参与人II采取了相应的策略时,没有人想要改变这种状况
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After World War II, there were two things that, I think, contributed to the huge housing boom at that time.
第二次世界大战后,我认为,那时房地产的巨大繁荣主要归结于两件事
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So if Player I chooses S1*, Player II will want to choose S2* since that's her best response.
所以当参与人I选择S1*时,参与人II就会选择最佳对策S2
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It's also about bank regulation, such as the Basel Accord, Basel I and Basel II.
还会讲到银行监管,比如巴塞尔协议和新巴塞尔协议
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There were some atrocities at the beginning of World War I, but there was nothing like this again until World War II and, of course, Bosnia.
一战初期的部分暴行令人毛骨悚然,而二战的惨烈程度更加骇人听闻,波斯尼亚的屠杀当然包括在内
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So here's Player I's payoff as a function of what Player II chooses and what Player I chooses, so we have that already.
这个就是参与人I的收益的方程,它是参与人I和II策略的函数,我们已经得到了
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, okay. So 1 plus 1/4 of 0 is 1, so if Player II chooses 0, player I's best response is to choose 1.
是1,因为1+0/4=1,参与人II选0时I的最佳对策是1
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Now I could go through again and do exactly the same thing for Player II, but I'm not going to do that because everything's symmetric.
如果我照此计算同理可得参与人II的,我就不算了,因为都是对称的
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For instance, if Player II picks left then Player I wants to pick bottom, but if Player II picks center, Player I wants to pick center.
例如,参与者II选择左,参与者I会选择下,但是若参与者II选择中,参与者I会选择中
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What is Player I's best response for each possible choice S2 of Player II?
每个s2下参与人I的最佳对策是什么
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So more succinctly, Player I and Player II, at this point where the lines cross, Player I and Player II are playing a best response to each other.
简单来说,参与人I和参与人II,在这两条线的交点处,互相都采用的是最佳对策
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So if Player II chooses 0, what is Player I's best response?
参与人II选0时I的最佳对策是什么
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If Player II chooses 4, what would be Player I's best response?
此时参与人I的最佳对策是什么呢
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So if Player I chooses 4, Player II should choose, I'm sorry, Player II chooses 4, player I should choose 2, and this is a straight line in between.
如果参与人I选4,参与人II要,说错了,是参与人II选4而I选2,这两点之间是一条直线
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The players here in this game are Player I and Player II.
这次博弈中有两个参与人,I和II
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It involves two players and we'll call the Players I and II and Player I has two choices, top and bottom, and Player II has three choices left, center, and right.
此博弈有两个参与人,分别为I和II,参与人I有两个选择,上和下,参与人II有三个选择,左中右
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So similarly, I would find that ?2 2 equals 1 plus B S1 and this is the best response of Player II, as it depends on Player I's choice of effort S1.
同理可得?2等于1+B*S1,?2是参与人II的最佳对策,因为它与参与人I的策略S1有关
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Player II's payoff, from the same choices, top for Player I, center for Player II, again we go along the top row and the center column, but this time we choose Player II's payoff, which is the second payoff, so it's 3.
在这种情况下参与人II的收益,即参与人I 选上参与人II选中时,注意下是上行和中列,但是现在我们要找参与人II的收益,也就是第二个收益,即3
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I've deleted all the strategies that were best, that are never best responses for Player I and all the strategies that are never best responses for Player II, and what I've got left is that little box.
我剔除了所有策略,所有非参与人I最佳对策的策略,还有非参与人II最佳对策的策略,最后只剩下了这个小方格
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If Player II chooses 4, then the synergy leads Player I to raise his best response all the way up to 2, but these strategies up here above 2 are never a best response for Player I. Is that right?
如果参与人II选4,协同导致,参与人I的最佳对策变成2,参与人I的那些大于2的策略,也永远不会成为最佳对策,对不对
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Okay, now I found out what PlayerIi's best response is to Player II, and what Player II's best response is to Player I for each possible choice of Player II up here, and for each possible choice of Player I down there.
好了,我们已经找到了参与人I,和参与人II互相的最佳对策了,这些是在参与人II有上面的可能策略,同时参与人I有下面的可能策略情况下
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Similarly, for Player II, the lowest Player I could ever do, is choose 0, in which case Player II would want to choose 1, so the strategies below 1 are never a best response for Player II.
同理,参与人I最低只能选0,此时参与人II应该会选1,小于1的策略不是参与人I的最佳对策
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Now we can do the same for Player II, we can draw Player II's best response as it depends on the choices of Player I, but rather than go through any math, I already know what that line's going to look like.
同理也可以画出参与人II的图像,参与人II的最佳对策,取决于参与人I的策略,不用任何数学的方法,我就知道图像是什么样的了
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So this the best response for Player II for every possible choice of Player I, and just to make sure we understand it, what this blue line tells me is you give me an S1, an effort level of Player I, I read up to the blue line and go across and that tells me Player II's best response.
这就是在任意参与人I的可选策略下,参与人II的最佳对策,为了让大家都明白,这条蓝色线表示给定一个S1,即参与人I的付出,通过查找蓝色的线,可以得出参与人II的最佳对策
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