And that mistake might mislead us if we start thinking the personal identity case.

如果考虑人格同一性的问题,这个错误可能会误导我们。

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Because when we've thought about the first case, the intuition seemed to be, ah,personality's the key to personal identity.

因为当我们思考案例一，得到的直觉似乎是，人格是个人认同感的关键。

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But when we thought about the second case, the intuition seems to be, body is the key to personal identity.

但当思考案例二时，得到的直觉似乎是，肉体是个人认同感的关键。

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Now,think about the implications of this second case for the theory of personal identity.

现在来思考一下案例二,关于个人认同感理论的暗示。

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So I'm gonna spend some time talking about examples that I think we would not find puzzling and walk our way back up to the case of personal identity.

我将会花点时间讲解,举一些大家不会感到疑惑的例子,不要让大家重新掉入,人格同一性的问题。

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let's turn now to the case we really wonder about personal identity.

现在我们说真正讨论的问题,人格同一性。

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And I tried to motivate this question by having you think about perhaps the possibility, if the soul view was the truth about personal identity, but imagine a case of complete irreversible amnesia, while nonetheless,it's still your soul continuing.

我试图通过让你们思考,灵魂理论有没有可能是个人认同感的真相，这个可能性，来推动这个问题，但是想象完全不可治愈的失忆，尽管你的灵魂仍然继续存活。

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