Most subsequent studies of strategy and force structure, including the 2010 QDR, reflect the same ideas.
Even the QDR recognized, at least implicitly, the risks associated with the Mobility Capability Study's recommendations.
Regrettably, several of the QDR-driven decisions would actually hamper, rather than enhance, strategic mobility.
The 2010 QDR made only marginal additional changes to the force structure inherited from the Bush Administration.
The 2010 QDR, however, did not endorse any metric for determining the size and shape of U.S. forces.
In short, the QDR airlift decisions are neither sound strategically nor a wise use of the taxpayer's resources.
Beginning with the 2001 QDR, plans made an explicit distinction between the objective of defeating aggression and decisively defeating an adversary.
By the first QDR, defense spending had declined by 33 percent in real terms and procurement spending had fallen by 60 percent.
If the Pentagon outlines needed capabilities without regard to budget considerations, the 2001 QDR could provide the impetus to boost defense spending.
In the same speech, Jones said that the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) should be strategy, not resource, driven, unlike the 1997 QDR.
To underscore the importance of reliable airborne transport to today's military, one need look no further than the Pentagon's new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
The 2006 QDR already foresaw that America had to deal with a range of crises, and Mr Gates's review only tinkers with America's military structure.
While this might seem a reasonable course of action, a recent Department of Commerce study on C-17 termination contradicts the QDR's underlying cost savings assumptions.
The NDP argued that adversaries were unlikely to pose the kind of conventional threat for which the BUR and QDR force postures had been primarily designed.
" Mr. McKeon goes on, though, to observe that the QDR "does little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability and force structure.
In addition, the 2001 QDR explicitly abandoned the focus of prior defense planning documents on two canonical MTWs, one in Southwest Asia and the other in Northeast Asia.
The QDR proposed that the minimum airlift capacity to support the two-war construct was approximately 50 million ton-miles per day with an additional surge sealift capacity of 10 million square feet.
In evaluating the QDR force structure, we were hampered by the lack of a clearly articulated force-planning construct that the military services and Congress can use to measure the adequacy of U.S. forces.
Based on the cost characteristics of the QDR force, the defense budget will need to equal 4.0 percent of the GDP in FY 2010 and, later, 4.3 percent of the GDP in FY 2020.
Until the 2001 QDR replaced threat-based force planning with an approach based on portfolios of capabilities, the DOD continued to measure the adequacy of its force structure in terms of the ability to defeat the most likely threats.
Rather, the 2010 QDR proposed to determine force sizing and composition by using the requirements of a diverse and complex set of scenarios, including long-duration stability operations and the defense of the homeland on par with a major regional conflict (MRC).
At the same time, both the 2006 QDR and the 2008 National Military Strategy argued that additional risk could be taken in the conventional force posture and even in some areas of advanced technology in order to harvest the additional resources needed to win the current fights.
It focused on a broader set of strategic missions than those guided by the BUR and 1997 QDR, including enhanced protection of the U.S. homeland against both state and non-state threats, deterrence in multiple theaters not only of direct aggression but also of investments in disruptive technologies such as ballistic missiles.
What is perhaps most interesting is, despite the rhetoric about the need for transformation and the desire not to be trapped into two large land campaigns, how little the 2001 QDR force structure differed from its predecessors going back to the BUR. (See Table 2.) In part, this reflected the impact of increased defense spending by the Bush Administration.
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