Just how big a governance snafu the Kerviel saga represents is a matter for debate.
And it confirms that Mr Kerviel had started to make trades without his superiors' approval back in 2005.
Mr Kerviel's limited holidays and late nights should also have raised red flags.
Mr Kerviel's credentials as a supervillain look less impressive in other ways too.
Although Mr Kerviel was properly found out on January 18th, he had tripped alarms inside the bank well before then.
Delays in confirming and settling derivative trades, a blind spot exploited by Mr Kerviel, are seen as an industry-wide problem.
Eurex, Europe's largest futures exchange, contacted SocGen about oddities in trading patterns in late 2007, which the Paris prosecutor says referred to Mr Kerviel's positions.
For UBS and its shareholders, the immediate questions should be why it was still vulnerable to this sort of alleged manipulation more than three years after Mr Kerviel's loss.
Analysts said that in the previous quarters that bank had begun an extensive risk-cutting program and reduced its large trading positions, following the losses from rogue trader Jerome Kerviel.
The sheer size of Mr Kerviel's exposure, the losses on which tripled as SocGen frenetically unwound its positions between January 21st and 23rd, has caused most bafflement among veterans of the futures markets.
Daniel Bouton, SocGen's boss, has argued that Mr Kerviel could easily conceal the vast positions he took because he had previously worked in the back office, so was familiar with the system of controls.
Like Mr Kerviel, who used his knowledge of the bank's plumbing to create fictitious trades to cover his tracks, Mr Adoboli is alleged by sources close to an internal investigation of the affair to have bet the bank's money on the future price of various stock indices and to have then hidden these moves by creating offsetting fake transactions.
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