运用委托代理理论对有限合伙制条件下基金管理人的业绩报酬设计进行了分析。
The performance reward mechanism of fund manager is analyzed under limited partnerships by applying principal-agent theory.
举个例子来说，如果一个游戏直接跟业绩和报酬绑定，游戏就有失去本来的娱乐和帮助作用的风险。
For instance, when a game is directly tied to performance and pay, there is the danger of the game no longer being fun or helpful.
不同的着眼点：老板着眼于提高一个员工的业绩，但员工则在报酬及职业晋升方面更感兴趣。
Different Agendas - the boss is focused on improving an employee's performance, while the employee is interested in compensation and career advancement.
应用推荐