Perhaps the argument shouldn't be, "We have to believe in souls because no mere physical object could reason."

也许论证不应该是,我们必须相信灵魂,因为所有的物理对象都不能推理

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Haven't I taken back the assumption that in order to believe it, you've got to be able to picture it? Not quite.

我不就是放弃了不能相信无法想象的东西，这个假设吗，其实不然。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

And he said, "Well, I believe there's a God, but honestly, I can't be sure there's a God.

之后他自答到,"我相信上帝,但说实话,我不能确定上帝的存在

耶鲁公开课 - 心理学导论课程节选

You're trusting the programmer did it right, but this now tells you something.

现在，我们不能保证这是对的，对吧？你必须相信程序员写的是对的。

麻省理工公开课 - 计算机科学及编程导论课程节选

As long as that is true, we can't continue to believe that invisible things can't be destroyed.

只要这是正确的,就不能相信无形的东西不能毁灭。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

And if the best the soul theorist can say is, "I can't explain it and neither can you," that's not a reason to believe this side.

如果灵魂理论者最多只能说,我不能解释,你也不能,这不是一个相信灵魂存在的理由

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Still, granted the premise, if you can't picture it or imagine it, you can't believe in it-- Should we conclude, therefore, that you can't believe you're going to be dead?

但让我们仍然基于，无法想象的东西是不能相信的这个前提-,我们就该得出，人不能相信自己的死亡,这一结论吗？

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

So even if it were true that belief requires picturing, and even if were true that you can't picture being dead from the inside, it wouldn't follow that you can't believe you're going to die.

所以即便不能相信无法想象之物这一说法，是真实的,人无法从内部想象死亡的感觉，也不代表不能相信自己会死亡这事实。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

I can't rely on Professor Guttag if I give this- if this code to him, I can't rely on him to type in a float. Actually I can, because he's a smart guy, but in general, I can't rely on the user-- I wouldn't do it right to see if you did.

当Guttag使用这段代码的时候-,我不能相信他一定会输入一个浮点数,实际上我能因为他很聪明，但是总体上来讲，别相信用户一定会按照规则来-,我会故意做错来试试你的程序的。

麻省理工公开课 - 计算机科学及编程导论课程节选

The idea seems to be that you can't believe in possibilities that you can't picture or imagine.

这个似乎也就是说,人们不能相信,他们无法想象的东西。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

But at least it doesn't seem to be the sort of argument, unlike some of the arguments I've considered last time about oh, nobody believes they're going to die because you can't picture being dead or what have you.

但这至少比我上次思考的，认为没有人相信自己会死，因为你不能想象死亡是什么样子,之类的论据有道理。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

should we conclude therefore, given that we've got the premise, "If you can't picture it or imagine it, then you can't believe in it," since I've just said, look, you can't imagine being dead, but that's not due to any failure of imagination, that's because there's nothing there to imagine or picture.

于是我们就应该基于这个前提，想象不了的东西就不能相信，得出结论吗“,我刚才已经说过，人不能想象自己的死亡，不是因为想象的失败，而是本来就没有东西可以想象。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

So I can't use thinking about the Williams cases as a method of deciding what do I really believe, the body view or the personality view?

因此我不能采用Williams的案例,来帮助我们判断我们应该相信哪种理论，肉体理论还是人格理论？

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选