文中提出了一种激励相容的可中断负荷管理合同模型，可引导用户自愿披露真实缺电成本信息。
An incentive compatible contract model is developed for interruptible load management, which can lead customers to voluntarily reveal their true outage costs information.
电力市场环境下，电力公司与用户之间存在的信息不对称性可能会导致可中断负荷管理的低效。
In electricity market, the informational asymmetries between utilities and customers may cause inefficiencies in interruptible load management.
在需求侧管理中，柔性负荷措施是一项重要内容，主要包括可中断负荷和用户侧发电等内容。
Flexible load control, an important program of DSM, comprises the interruptible load and demand side generation.
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