我们发现单位价格采购机制在最优拍卖和标准拍卖下都会给垄断者带来更大的期望效用。
We find that unit price mechanisms bring no less expected profit to the monopoly in both optimal mechanisms and in standard auctions.
但由于最初的研究主要集中于标准拍卖和单物品的拍卖，最近几年又延伸到多物品拍卖。
However, as the initial research focused on standard auction and single item auction, in recent years it has extended to more goods auction.
第二章以博弈论为基础，基于基准模型的七个假定，阐述了四种标准拍卖中投标商的竞价策略问题。
In the second chapter, based on Game Theory and the seven suppose in the Benchmark Model, the bidding strategy of the bidder in the four standard auction is elaborated.
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