本文以委托代理理论为基础， ， 从博弈论视角对企业预算管理制度进行了分析。
Based on principal - agency, the thesis analyzes budget management system from the angle of game theory.
从不完全契约理论和委托代理框架的视角分析开放式基金治理结构，可以得出不存在最优的治理结构的结论。
With the analysis under the incomplete contract theory and principal-agent theory, there is no such an optimum governance structure for open-end fund either contract style or corporate style.
以此为基础，在委托代理理论的视角下，分析了大股东与中小股东之间存在着的委托代理关系。
Based on these, we can get the conclusion that large shareholder is agency, but small shareholder is principle from the theory of principle-agent.
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