本文将股利政策作为一个可观测变量引入单层、双重委托代理模型，详细分析了降低代理成本的途径。
This article builds single and double principal-agent theory models and studies measures to reduce agent cost by using dividend policy as an observable variable.
文章的研究思路是首先从委托—代理角度分析，经理人激励机制建设可降低代理成本，有效提升证券公司的核心竞争力。
Research of article thinking at first from principal-agent analyses that manager incentive mechanism construction can reduce the agent cost, promote the competitiveness of securities broker companies.
从投资者和基金经理之间委托代理产生的代理成本的角度，分析了我国封闭式基金折价的原因。
From the Angle of the agent's cost which comes from the principal-agent between the investor and fund manager, the article analyses the reason of the discount of closed-end fund of our country.
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