本文利用不完全信息动态博弈模型，探讨了金融危机、监管者的软预算约束与银行道德风险之间的关系。
Using a dynamic game model of incomplete information, this paper discusses the relations among financial crisis, regulators soft budget constraints and bankers moral hazard.
因此制度层面的金融危机完全可以通过法律监管加以调控，而全球经济层面的金融危机则取决于各国经济战略博弈。
This paper obtained at the institutional level that the financial crisis can be regulated by law regulation, while as for the global economy, financial crisis depends on national economic strategy.
通过对药品监管者的监管博弈分析认为：轻微的惩罚对于减少信用危机毫无益处，反而会助长危机的恶化。
By analyzing the supervision of supervisor in game theory, we conclude that slight penalty has no any use of reducing credit crisis. On the contrary, it will encourage the deterioration of crisis.
应用推荐