In sealed auction based electricity markets, generation companies could develop their optimal bidding strategies through estimating bidding behaviors of competitors.
在采用暗标拍卖的电力市场环境中,发电公司可以通过估计竞争对手的报价行为来构造最优的报价策略。
At common instance, the seller's expected profit increase with the increase of the bidders common belief in the English auction however descend in the first price sealed auction.
在一般情况下英式拍卖中卖者的期望利润随着投标者信念的增大而增大,而在第一价格封标拍卖中则恰恰相反。
This paper analyzes the bidding game model of project tender company with incomplete information in the bidding market of bill of quantities, by using the first-price sealed auction.
本文通过运用博弈论中一级密封价格拍卖理论,研究了建设工程投标企业在不完全信息下的工程量清单投标报价博弈模型。
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