Since the content of these exchanges are not defined, presumably the legislation could even be interpreted to permit the transfer of dual-use technologies, military secrets or other information vital to U.S. national security interests.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Center For Security Policy

The 2001, 2006, and 2010 QDRs attempted to address this fact, but failed to make a compelling argument, in part because they juxtaposed the requirements to maintain a two-MRC force structure with the requirements to address other missions and investment objectives, whether in capabilities for other missions or in advanced military technologies.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Section IV: Building a Two-MRC Force for the 21st Century

Given that many of the relevant technologies are inherently applicable to military uses - notably, delivering nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction over long distances via ballistic missiles - these steps will ineluctably result in greater threats to American citizens, interests and allies, as well.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Farewell to space