委托--代理问题新制度主义经济学和信息经济学视角下的“委托--代理问题” (principal-agency problem) 是私有化支持者的最重要理论资源之一, 似乎也更当时。
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principal agency problem 代理问题
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The overconfidence bias of the principal and agent on the would firm ' s common signal quality of increase agency cost and worsen the moral hazard problem.
委托人和代理人在公司信息方面的过度自信偏差都将提高代理成本、恶化道德风险问题。
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Professor Michael Jensen of Harvard Business School (along with Bill Meckling of Rochester) did some formidable research now almost 40 years ago on the agency-principal problem in modern corporate America.
FORBES: The Difference Between The Mindsets Of Founders And Professional Managers
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