This paper researches the optimal incentive contract based on overconfidence of investment fund manager from the behavioral finance view point.
从行为金融角度出发,对基金经理过度自信情形下的最优激励契约进行研究。
This paper, based on the agent conflict of the shareholder and manage, studies the corporate hedging, optimal incentive contract and information disclosure.
本文在股东与管理者代理冲突的指导框架下,阐述了企业套期、最优激励合约以及信息披露策略等方面的问题。
I assume that the linear gross return is the only observable variable. Then the optimal incentive contract of managers is acheved. I also get some meaningful results.
得出在线性总收益作为单一可观测变量条件下,经理人的最优激励合同并分析了几个有意义的结果。
应用推荐