根据代理理论的解释,企业负债的原因是为了利用负债来约束股东与管理层之间的冲突,降低股权代理成本。
According to agency theory, the cause of enterprise incurring debt is to ease up the conflict between the management and shareholders and limit equity agency cost by debt.
但由于债务本身亦存在代理成本,因此,企业资本结构决策必须在股权代理成本与债务代理成本之间做出权衡。
For debt also has agency cost, an enterprise has to weigh between equity agency cost and debt agency cost when making capital structure decision.
本文基于一个两时点大股东掠夺模型,考察了股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求之间的关系。
Based on a two-stage large shareholder exploitation model, we examine the relationship among ownership structure, agency cost and external auditing demand.
应用推荐