In order to study the optimal incentive schemes when both manager's ability type and effort are unobservable, this paper sets up an information revelation model of manager.
为了研究当管理者的能力类型和努力都是不可观察时的最优激励方案,建立了一个管理者的信息披露模型。
In Type 3 situations, there are few alternatives, but the ability to switch without difficulty creates a threat that companies can use to negotiate concessions from existing suppliers.
在第三种情况下,几乎没有其他选择,但毫无困难地转换的能力造成了一种威胁,企业可以利用这种威胁与现有供应商谈判让步。
This type of worker has confidence in his ability, and is likely to feel that collaboration is a waste of time.
这种类型的员工对自己的能力有信心,可能会觉得合作是浪费时间。
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