本文研究了合作结构的模型及相应的限制以策，在此限制对策中可行结盟是那些属于分割系统的结盟；
We study a model of cooperation structure and the corresponding restricted game, in which the feasible coalitions are those belonging to a partition system.
具有合作结构的对策是指带有可行结盟集族的合作对策，而可行结盟描述了在对策中可以进行协商的结盟。
Games with cooperation structure are cooperative games with a family of feasible coalitions, that describes which coalitions can negotiate in the game.
采用演绎推理的分析方法，讨论了带限制结盟的单调集对策的边缘值，该值是对经典集对策边缘值的一种推广，证明了带限制结盟单调集对策边缘值的一些性质。
In this paper the method of syllogism is used to discuss the marginalistic value for monotonic set games with restricted coalitions, which is the extension of the classical one and is also proved.
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