激励、监控与报酬契约直接影响着企业的经营业绩，但在信息不对称下，它们的关系非常复杂。
Incentive, monitoring and compensation contracts directly affect performance of enterprises, but they have very complex interactions under the circumstance of asymmetric information.
相对业绩比较信息能改进委托—代理关系中的激励与效率。
Comparative Performance Information can improve the incentives and efficiency in principal agent relationships.
股东与高管人员之间的目标不一致和信息的分散化产生了高管人员的激励问题。
The Discrepancy between the shareholder's aim and that of the senior managers, and the decentralization of information bring about the issue of how to motivate the senior managers.
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