The purpose of the paper is to study the curvature improving on the linear incentive contract in the principle-agent framework.
本文的目的是在一个委托代理的框架内研究改进线性激励契约的曲率。
I assume that the linear gross return is the only observable variable. Then the optimal incentive contract of managers is acheved. I also get some meaningful results.
得出在线性总收益作为单一可观测变量条件下,经理人的最优激励合同并分析了几个有意义的结果。
I assume that the linear gross return is the only observable variable. Then the optimal incentive contract of managers is acheved. I also get some meaningful results.
得出在线性总收益作为单一可观测变量条件下,经理人的最优激励合同并分析了几个有意义的结果。
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