This thesis conducts research on the relationship between controlling shareholder and benefits expropriation by large shareholder after control transfers.
控股股东侵占行为是困扰世界各国公司治理的核心问题，是公司治理理论研究的前沿课题。
Based on a two-stage large shareholder exploitation model, we examine the relationship among ownership structure, agency cost and external auditing demand.
本文基于一个两时点大股东掠夺模型，考察了股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求之间的关系。
Based on a two-stage large shareholder exploitation model, we examine the relationship among ownership structure, agency cost and external auditing demand.
本文基于一个两时点大股东掠夺模型，考察了股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求之间的关系。
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