本文将股利政策作为一个可观测变量引入单层、双重委托代理模型，详细分析了降低代理成本的途径。
This article builds single and double principal-agent theory models and studies measures to reduce agent cost by using dividend policy as an observable variable.
在道德风险问题的委托代理关系中，委托人对代理人行动的监督与对自然状态的观测所起的效果是等价的。
In the principle-agent problem with moral hazard, the observation of the state of nature has the same effect with the monitoring of agent's action.
在道德风险问题的委托代理关系中，委托人对代理人行动的监督与对自然状态的观测所起的效果是等价的。
In the principle-agent problem with moral hazard, the observation of the state of nature has the same effect with the monitoring of agent's action.
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