Similarly,suppose we thought that the body view was the correct view and we imagine, again,some sort of case of complete amnesia.

同样的，假设肉体理论是正确的，我们再次想象这个完全失忆的案例。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Suppose the soul theorist answers that last objection by saying,Ain't ever going to happen.

假设灵魂理论者对上个异议的答案是,这事情根本不可能发生。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Theory is very often a purely speculative undertaking.

理论通常是假设性的。

耶鲁公开课 - 文学理论导论课程节选

Suppose that as a kind of back-up security whenever revolution has done is-- produced so much redundancy in the brain that either half of the brain was sufficed.

假设我们有理论支撑,未来的进化-,会使大脑产生很多多余的部分,我们只需要一半大脑就足够了。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Let's suppose the brain version of the theory is the best version.

我们先假设，大脑观点是这个理论的最佳版本。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Would that--Suppose the personality view of personality identity was correct.

假设个人认同感的人格理论观点是正确的。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Now,let's suppose we believe the personality theory of personal identity.

让我们假设相信个人认同感的人格理论。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Suppose that the body theory of personal identity is correct.

假设肉体理论才是正确的。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

And let's just suppose the correct theory of personal identity is Van Inwagen such as to put aside any worries we might have along with van Inwagen, that we discussed previously, as to whether or not on resurrection day that would really be you or not. Suppose it would be you.

假设正确的个人认同感理论是这样的,例如将之前讨论,理论时的种种担忧放在一边，也就是审判日当天,到底是不是真的你，我们假设就是你。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选