• He didn't actually convince me of that, but suppose we thought souls are simple, and we think simple things can't split.

    他并没有说服我,但让我们假设灵魂就是简单的,并且简单的东西无法被分裂。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • But we need to consider the possibility that souls can't split.

    但我们需要考虑灵魂无法分裂的可能。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Notice, this is not an argument that souls don't exist.

    注意,这不是争论,灵魂是否存在。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • It would follow,then,that souls can't split.

    顺理成章,灵魂无法被分裂。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • So although I'm trying to sketch the dualist position, as I explained on Tuesday, I don't myself believe in souls.

    尽管我在尝试去概述,二元论的观点,就像我在周二所说的,我自己并不相信灵魂

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • But since I don't believe in souls, I want to choose between the body view and the personality view.

    但因为我不相信灵魂,我想从身体理论和人格理论中选择。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • If souls are simples and simples can't split, there's no possibility of having two things with a relevant soul.

    如果灵魂是单纯无法分割的,就没有两个实体拥有相同灵魂的可能。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And it certainly looks as though if you don't believe in souls, you have to accept the body theory of personal identity.

    而且很明显,如果你不信灵魂论,你就只能接受,人格同一性的肉体论了。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Even if there're no souls, we don't have to say that the key to personal identity is the sameness of the body.

    即使没有灵魂的存在,我们也不用,肯定人格同一性的关键在于,同样的肉体。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • I think it's fairly clear that you don't need to appeal to souls in order to do that.

    我想大家应该能非常清楚地看到,这样的诉求并非是必须的

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Perhaps the argument shouldn't be, "We have to believe in souls because no mere physical object could reason."

    也许论证不应该是,我们必须相信灵魂,因为所有的物理对象都不能推理

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Rock believed in souls, he just didn't think they were the key to personal identity.

    洛克相信灵魂论,但他认为,这并不是人格统一性的关键。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Well--since I myself don't believe in souls, it's hard to surprise you to learn that I don't think the soul theory of personal identity is right.

    因为我本身不相信灵魂的存在,所以你们肯定能想到,我认为人格同一性的灵魂论,不是正确的。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Suppose somebody says, "Look, it's true that we don't need to appeal to souls in order to explain why bodies move around in a nonrandom fashion.

    假如有人说,听着,我承认我们不需要诉诸,灵魂来解释,为何肉体能以非随机的形式移动

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Basically that the various arguements that might be offered for believing in souls don't seem very compelling upon examinations so there's no good reason to posit this extra entity.

    基本上要我们相信灵魂的,不同的理据,都经不住考察,所以我们没有很好的理由,来假设这个额外实体的存在。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • If souls can't split,it can only follow one half of the brain, and that's why we'll get somebody that's got one half, sometimes the other half,but never both halves.

    如果灵魂不能分割,只跟随一半大脑,才能有只有其中一个得到半个大脑的人存活,而没有两人同时存活的状况。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Suppose--I don't believe in souls,but suppose there really are souls.

    我不相信灵魂的存在,但假设有灵魂。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And it's because of that that I think we shouldn't be dismissive of the dualist when the dualist says, "We've got to believe in souls in order to explain it."

    正因如此,我认为我们不应该轻视二元论者,当他们说,我们只有相信灵魂才能解释这些

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • That approach pretty clearly isn't going to work for souls, because a soul--and again, we've got in mind this metaphysical view, according to which it's something immaterial-- isn't something we see.

    但这种方法显然不能用来证明灵魂的存在,因为灵魂,我再一次说明,从这种形而上学的角度来看,灵魂是非物质实体,我们看不到它

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • We don't directly observe souls with our five senses.

    我们无法通过五感直接观察到灵魂

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • So it's at least worth emphasizing the fact that even if we don't believe in souls, we could still believe in the possibility of surviving one's death, the death of one's body.

    所以我们至少要强调,即使我们不相信灵魂论,我们还是可以相信死后复生的,可能,肉体死亡后复活的可能。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And if it's not really invisible, even there is a notion of invisible such are the things that invisible in that sense can't be destroyed, souls are not invisible in that sense.

    如果它不是完全无形的,即使有无形的定义,根据定义有些东西是无形的,无形的东西不可毁灭,但是灵魂在这个意义上不是无形的。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • If that's right, if that's the right thing to say, then what we have to say is, "We don't need to appeal to souls in order to explain emotions and feelings.

    如果这是正确的,如果这种说法正确,那么,我们不得不说,我们不需要诉诸灵魂来,解释情感和感觉

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • If souls can't split,one of them is mistaken.

    若灵魂无法分割,他们中必有一人错。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • That's why we wish--maybe some of us believe, but at the very least the rest of us, many of us hoped--there were souls, so that death wouldn't have to be the end.

    这就是为什么我们会希望,也许我们有人相信,但我们之中其他人,我们中的多数人希望有灵魂的存在,那样死亡就不是终结了。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • Now,as you know,I don't believe in souls.

    你们都知道,我是不相信灵魂的。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • We can't observe souls.

    我们无法看到灵魂

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

  • And tributary, of course, if you don't believe in souls, if you don't believe in soul's exist, that you certainly can't appear to the existence of souls, the continuative soul, the sameness of soul as the key to personal identity.

    还有,必然地,如果你不相信灵魂这回事,如果你不相信它的存在,你肯定无法,进一步相信什么灵魂的延续,无法相信同样的灵魂,是保证人格同一性的关键。

    耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

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