Now that by the by that somebody who believes in souls could also accept the personality theory of personal identity.

即使是相信灵魂论的人,也可以接受,人格同一性的人格论。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Now if we accept the body theory, then of course we turn to the question ? "Could I survive my death?"

如果我们接受了肉体论，我们肯定会问,我可以死后复生吗“

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

So, the personality theory of personal identity can be accepted by physicalists, and it can be accepted by dualists.

因此人格同一性的人格论,既可以被物理主义学者接受,也可以被二元论者接受。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

And it certainly looks as though if you don't believe in souls, you have to accept the body theory of personal identity.

而且很明显,如果你不信灵魂论，你就只能接受,人格同一性的肉体论了。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

So again the point I was just emphasizing was even if we accept the personality theory, this doesn't threaten our being physicalists.

我刚才再次强调的一点,即使我们接受了人格论，也不会和物理主义学者的身份冲突。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

In those moves when I accept the body theory, I'm inclined to say, no, follow the brain.

在我接受肉体论的过程中，我认为，不，应该由大脑决定。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

So if we accept the body theory, ? would there be dead alive after death, ? could there be survivor that is at my body?

所以如果我们接受了肉体论，那么人死后还会复活吗，还会有人以我的肉体重生吗？

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

All I want to say is the fan of the brain theory you got a brain transplant, what's really happened is somebody else has got a torsel transplant.

我想说的是遵循大脑论,你接受的是大脑移植，但事实是,是另一个人接受了躯干移植。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Even if you believe in souls, you can accept the body theory.

如果你相信灵魂论，你也可以同时接受肉体论。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Suppose we adopt that version of the body view.

假设我们接受了那个版本的肉体论。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

If we accept this version of the body theory, we say the crucial part of the body for personal identity is not, saying The crucial part of the body is the sameness of brain.

如果我们接受了肉体论的这个版本，我们就承认了人格统一性,最关键的肉体部位并不在于,要人格同一，肉体最重要的部位是,同样的大脑。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选