The so-called "Higher pleasures or nobler virtues" are simply those, according to Bentham, that produce stronger, longer pleasure.
所谓“更高级快乐或更高贵美德“,在边沁看来不过是更持久更强烈的快乐。
How can a utilitarian distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures from lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones? Yes?
功利主义者何以将性质上更高级的快乐,与较低级,基本无价值的区分开呢,请说?
Mill's point is that the higher pleasures do require cultivation and appreciation and education.
穆勒的观点是,高级快乐的确需要,培养,鉴赏,和教育。
Shouldn't we distinguish between higher pleasures and lower pleasures?
难道不该区分高级快乐和低级快乐吗?
All right, Is there anyone who disagrees with Joe and who thinks that our experiment disproves Mill's test, shows that that's not an adequate way, that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within the utilitarian framework?
好,有没有人不同意乔,谁认为我们的实验推翻了穆勒的检验,说明它并不足以证明,在功利主义范畴内可以分辨出高级快乐?
How many think that it does succeed of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures?
有多少人觉得它成功地,在功利主义范畴区分了高级和低级快乐?
But then, page eight, also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish higher from lower pleasures.
但在第八页,即第二章中,他提出功利主义者可以区分,高级和低级快乐。
Who's to say, a Benthamite might argue, who is to say which of these pleasures, whose pleasures are higher, worthier, nobler than others?
边沁主义者也许会问,谁能说这些快乐中,谁的更高级,更有价值或者更高贵呢?
In his book Utilitarianism, Mill tries to show that critics to the contrary it is possible within the utilitarian framework to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures.
在穆勒的《功利主义》中,他试图证明,与批判者所言相反,在功利主义的框架下,是能区分高级和低级快乐的。
And lying behind this idea, I think, is the claim, the intuition, that it's a presumption to judge whose pleasures are intrinsically higher or worthier or better.
我认为这一观点暗含了一种主张,认为从本质上判定,谁的快乐,更高级,更有价值,或更好是非常无礼的。
So here, you have an attempt to distinguish higher from lower pleasures.
至此,大家已经试图区分了高级和低级快乐。
But once having been cultivated and educated, people will see, not only see the difference between higher and lower pleasures, but will actually prefer the higher to the lower.
但他同时认为,人一旦接受教育和培养,就应该不仅能区分高级和低级快乐,而且会真的更偏好高级快乐。
And we need to ask in the case of higher or worthier pleasures are there theories of the good life that can provide independent moral standards for the worth of pleasures?
我们要问,就更高的或更有价值的快乐而言,是否存在“良善生活“的理论,能为快乐的价值,提供独立的道德标准?
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