Similarly,suppose we thought that the body view was the correct view and we imagine, again,some sort of case of complete amnesia.

同样的，假设肉体理论是正确的，我们再次想象这个完全失忆的案例。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

And Balzac, to go back to Balzac, he put it the way Parisians view the provinces, and this is still the case.

而巴尔扎克,讲回巴尔扎克,他使巴黎人对乡下产生先入为主的印象,这种印象一直保持到现在

耶鲁公开课 - 1871年后的法国课程节选

But I want to deal now with a couple of interesting case studies about moral feelings from a psychological point of view.

现在我想讲几个有趣的案例分析,这些案例都是从心理学角度分析道德情感。

耶鲁公开课 - 心理学导论课程节选

That's a little bit like the case we worried about when we started thinking about the soul view,right?

这就有点像我们刚开始研究灵魂观点时,担心的问题了，对吧？

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Since that's obviously the wrong thing to say about the case, we should reject the personality view.

既然这显然是错误的，我们就应该拒绝人格理论。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

in fact,have splitting of personality So the very same case raises the very same problem for both the body view and the personality view.

分裂人格的可能,就是这同一个案例引起了从肉体理论,和人格理论两个角度相同的问题。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Given the no branching view,the no branching rule, we can say,in the ordinary case,look, there really wasn't anybody imprinted with my memories and desires in Michigan.

在这个无分支这个规则下，通常的案例下，我们能说，密歇根并没有人植入了我的记忆和欲望。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

It's sort of like the case with the factory blocking the view.

这就跟,工厂挡住视线的情况类似。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

And I tried to motivate this question by having you think about perhaps the possibility, if the soul view was the truth about personal identity, but imagine a case of complete irreversible amnesia, while nonetheless,it's still your soul continuing.

我试图通过让你们思考,灵魂理论有没有可能是个人认同感的真相，这个可能性，来推动这个问题，但是想象完全不可治愈的失忆，尽管你的灵魂仍然继续存活。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

If the body view adds the no branching principle, then we can say,look,in the case of this sort of splitting-- This example is known in the to philosophical literature as fission, like nuclear fission when a big atom splits into two.

如果肉体理论加入无分支原则，我们就能说，在这种分裂的情况下-,这种分裂在哲学文献中叫做裂变，就像原子一分为二的核裂变。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选