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Through the dynamics of the counter-plot, the similes reassure us of what Hartman calls the "graceful coexistence of free will and divine providence."
从这个反计的整个催动力来看，这些比喻向我们再次确认了被哈特曼称为,“自由意志和神圣天意华丽的共存“的结合“
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But we've got free will, so there's got to be something more to us than just being a physical object.
而人有自由意志,所以在我们身上有着,超越物理实体的特质
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All is not lost; the unconquerable Will, And study of revenge, immortal hate, And courage never to submit or yield: And what is else not to overcome?
我们没有完全失败，那无法被征服的意志，复仇的信念，永恒的仇恨，以及我们的勇气，不曾消逝：,还有什么能将我们击溃？
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But in the meantime you see that we can't mess with conventional systems by imposing the individuality of our will on them and expecting anything to change.
所以，我们不能,以个人的意志改变,一个事物在惯例中的意义。
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For instance, when we deal with one another in a legal and a moral setting, we think in terms of free will and responsibility.
举个例子,当我们在一套法律和道德系统中,与其他人相处时,我们会从自由意志和责任的角度进行思考
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And those plans and commands descend down this spinal cord to drive the muscles in our arm, to guide the arm where we like it to go.
这些计划和指令沿着脊髓而下,驱动我们胳膊的肌肉，指挥我们的胳膊按意志活动。
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And when we go to the title page of A Boy's Will we see that this New England poet publishes his first book, in fact, in London in 1913, there on New Oxford Street.
当我们看到“少年的意志“这个题目时,我们知道他在新英格兰发表这第一本书时，实际上是1913年在新牛津街。
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How can we begin Glaucon? the domestication of the spirited Glaucon?
我们如何开始,驯化意志型的？
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So these moments of landscape description offer up that consistently Christian-inflected theory of the universe, that sense of transcendence as structure, as something that's moving inexorably, that will take all time to complete.
通过这些景象的描述,我们可以看到一种,一直受到基督教影响的,关于宇宙的理论，这种理论以超自然的感觉为主体，就像一些不为人的意志而转移，需要我们穷其一生去完成的事。
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Give up the conclusion that we've got-- Give up the premise that "We've got free will," it won't follow that we're non-physical.
放弃我们已得到的结论,放弃"我们有自由意志"这个前提,就不能推出我们是非物质的
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There are philosophers who have said we certainly believe that we've got free will, but it's an illusion.
有这样一些哲学家,他们说,我们确实相信自己有自由意志,但这只是一种错觉
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If a deterministic system could nonetheless have free will, we could still be purely physical systems.
如果一个决定论系统能在此情况下,仍然拥有自由意志,我们仍可能只是纯粹的物理系统
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We don't refer--we have no reason to refer, - if we respect the autonomy of the poem as such, we don't refer-- we don't appeal to an authorial intention.
我们不能，我是说如果我们尊重，诗歌的意志自由的话，我们不能也没有理由-,为诗歌加上作者的意图。
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Suppose we do believe in incompatibilism and believe that we've got free will.
假定我们相信不相容论,并认为人有自由意志
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The soul is just, he tells us, when the appetites, spiritedness, and reason cooperate with reason, ruling, spirit and appetite, just as in the polis, the philosopher-king rules the warriors and the workers.
他告诉我们，灵魂将是正义的，当欲望，意志及理性，与理性统治，意志,及欲望合作，一如城市中的正义，哲学家国王统治,战士及工人。
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The similes are for him instrument in the poem's larger agenda to reinforce our faith in the coexistence of free will and divine providence -- difficult, huge concepts.
这些比喻在这首诗更深的议程中是作为工具,来深化我们对自由意志和神圣天命的共存,所持的信念--这是两个艰深宏大的概念。
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that the problem of free will and foreknowledge puts us in.
关于自由意志和先知的问题把我们套了进去。
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You need the soul in order to explain free will.
那就是我们需要灵魂来解释自由意志
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To explain the fact that we've got free will, so the objection goes, we have to appeal to-- we have to posit--the existence of a soul, something non-physical, something more than purely physical.
要解释我们有自由意志这一事实,反驳者会说,我们不得不诉诸,或者假定灵魂存在,这里提到的灵魂是非物质并超出物质的东西
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So number one, we have free will.
所以,一,我们有自由意志
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We have free will.
我们拥有自由意志
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Paradise Lost as a whole clearly wants us to believe that God has foreknowledge and it also clearly wants us to believe that we have free will, but the similes seem just as often to open up and to question the poem's doctrinal conclusions.
整体来说很清楚地是想让我们相信,上帝具有先知的能力,并且还想让我们相信人生来有自由的意志，但是这些比喻看起来只是为我们揭露,并质疑了诗歌本身的学理上的总结。
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We don't really have free will.
我们并不是真的有自由意志
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I assume what Socrates means by that is though each individual will, each of us, embody all three features of soul, appetite, spirit, and reason, only one of these will be the dominate trait in each of us.
我假定苏格拉底是指,虽然每个个体，我们每一个人，都将体现灵魂,欲望，意志与理性的全部三种特质，而仅有其中一项,会主宰我们每一个人。
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The fact that we've got free will is something that most of us take for granted about ourselves.
我们拥有自由意志这一事实,被大多数人认为理所应当
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It follows, if nothing subject to determinism has free will, but we have free will, it follows that we're not subject to determinism.
得到结论,如果任何遵守决定论的实体,都没有自由意志,但我们有自由意志,那就表明我们不遵守决定论
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You put these things together and you get the conclusion that we, since we've got free will, can't be a purely physical object.
综上所述 你就能得到这样的结论,由于我们有自由意志,所以不可能是纯粹的物理对象
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But since we've got free will, we must be something more than a merely physical object.
但由于我们拥有自由意志,我们必定不只是纯粹的物理对象
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One could similarly have a course devoted to the problem of free will.
我们系同样还开设有一门课,专门讨论自由意志问题
应用推荐