And why is that? Within the perspective of Milton's free-will theology, sin can't exist as an external reality.
为什么呢?从弥尔顿自由意志的学说的角度来看,原罪是不可能以永久现实的形式存在的。
Through the dynamics of the counter-plot, the similes reassure us of what Hartman calls the "graceful coexistence of free will and divine providence."
从这个反计的整个催动力来看,这些比喻向我们再次确认了被哈特曼称为,“自由意志和神圣天意华丽的共存“的结合“
Even if something that did have free will would have to be non-physical, it wouldn't follow that we're non-physical.
即使某些有自由意志的东西,必然是非物质的,那也推不出来我们是非物质的
God learned immediately after creating this unique being, that he will exercise his free will against God.
上帝在创造了这种独特的生命后马上意识到,他们将会以自由意志违抗上帝。
Eight features of literary modernism: An obsession with the idea of art's autonomy, the idea that art is its own law, that it responds to no other laws, that it has no other purpose than its own purposes.
第一,对艺术意志自由问题的困扰,对艺术是自身的法律,它不响应其他准则,它只有本身这唯一的目的,也就是说。
For instance, when we deal with one another in a legal and a moral setting, we think in terms of free will and responsibility.
举个例子,当我们在一套法律和道德系统中,与其他人相处时,我们会从自由意志和责任的角度进行思考
We don't refer--we have no reason to refer, - if we respect the autonomy of the poem as such, we don't refer-- we don't appeal to an authorial intention.
我们不能,我是说如果我们尊重,诗歌的意志自由的话,我们不能也没有理由-,为诗歌加上作者的意图。
Please observe too that it is not his reason that will determine human actions but his will alone, free of the moderating control of reason.
注意这不是他仅凭意志,决定人类行为的理由,而是理性对自由意志产生了潜移默化的影响
When you walk through that door, it's an act of free will.
当你走进这个门的时候,这是自由意志的选择。
Hartman's absolutely right to insist that no theological concept is as important to Paradise Lost as free will on the one hand and divine providence on the other.
哈特曼有绝对的权利坚持说任何神学的概念,在中的意义都不足与匹敌自由意志的重要性,也不足以和神圣的天命相比。
This is the pulsating vehicle for his precious theology of free will and for his politics of liberty.
这是他宝贵的自由意志神学观点和,推崇自由的政治主张的充满活力的载体。
He's taken it from somebody else, ; and in doing so I think he's doing this deliberately; he's exposing some of the darker ironies behind his own literary ambition.
但他从别人那里借用了这个说法,他的做法让我认为他是故意这么做的;,他这是在他自己自由意志的背后,表现一些尖刻的讽刺。
Give up the conclusion that we've got-- Give up the premise that "We've got free will," it won't follow that we're non-physical.
放弃我们已得到的结论,放弃"我们有自由意志"这个前提,就不能推出我们是非物质的
It's an everyday occurrence that we can think and reason and feel and be creative, or choose otherwise and have free will.
我们能思考推理,感知创造,或能做出不同的选择,拥有自由意志,都是每天存在的事
No physical object that's subject to determinism could have free will, so we don't have free will.
而遵循决定论的物理实体,是没有自由意志的,所以人没有自由意志
It's an act of free will. Somebody's leaving.
这是自由意志的选择,有人会离开。
There's another argument descartes could have made that's a lot less subtle than the ones he did make, which is "That thing responsible for free will and love and consciousness?
笛卡尔本可以指出一个,比他所举论据,更为巧妙的论据,也就是,"这东西会是引起自由意志,爱恋,与意识的原因吗
But still, let me quickly point out why you could resist the argument from free will to the existence of a soul.
但我还是要简短地指出,为什么你们会拒不认同,从自由意志的角度来论证灵魂的存在
If a deterministic system could nonetheless have free will, we could still be purely physical systems.
如果一个决定论系统能在此情况下,仍然拥有自由意志,我们仍可能只是纯粹的物理系统
So maybe that's why we need to believe in souls in order to explain free will.
或许我们需要相信灵魂的理由就是,为了便于解释自由意志
You can't peer into your mind and see the fact that you've got free will.
你不能通过窥视自己的心灵,确切地看到你有自由意志
I simply want to point out enough about the problem to help you see why I don't think free will is a slam-dunk for the soul.
我只是想尽可能地,把这个问题提出来,以帮助你们认识到,为什么我不认同自由意志是灵魂的制胜利器
We are physical objects that labor under the illusion that we have free will, but after all, free will isn't something that you can just see, right?
我们生活在人有自由意志,这样的错觉下,但毕竟,自由意志不是那种可以看得到的东西,对吧
It can't exist as a force that conceives a human individual from the outside without that individual's consent because we all freely sin. No one can be compelled to do anything within the Miltonic theology of free will.
不存在那种不经人类同意就从外界,构造人类个体的力量,因为我们都自由地带着原罪,在弥尔顿自由意志的学说下,没有人被强迫做任何事。
Because the notion of free will was that even if I was in the very same spot again, the very same situation again, I could've chosen differently.
因为自由意志的内涵就是,即使我再次处在相同的地点,相同的情况下,我也可能做出不同的选择
We can say that, but I wonder if it's possible even for these similes to convince us of the easy coexistence of these two incredibly important theological categories, free will and divine foreknowledge.
我们可以说,但是我还是怀疑,这些比喻是否能够,使我们相信如此这种两个太过于重要的相异点,即自由意志和神圣天命,之间的共存性。
So even if determinism were true of us, that wouldn't rule out our having free will, because you can-- appearances to the contrary notwithstanding-- have both determinism and free will.
所以即使我们真的服从于决定论,那也不能排除我们有自由意志的可能,因为你能,尽管表面看来并非如此,同时遵从决定论和拥有自由意志
And the drama of human life should revolve not around the search for eternal life but around the moral conflict and tension between a good god's design for creation and the free will of human beings that can corrupt that good design.
而关于人类生命的戏剧,不应该围绕于对永生的追寻,而是道德的冲突和紧张状态,在上帝创造的美好,和人类能腐蚀这种美好创造的自由意志间的冲突。
The similes are for him instrument in the poem's larger agenda to reinforce our faith in the coexistence of free will and divine providence -- difficult, huge concepts.
这些比喻在这首诗更深的议程中是作为工具,来深化我们对自由意志和神圣天命的共存,所持的信念--这是两个艰深宏大的概念。
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