Maybe in this world, minds and bodies are identical, even though in other logically possible worlds the identity comes apart.

也许在这个世界,心灵和身体就是相同的,即使在其他逻辑世界中,不存在这种同一性

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So the secret to personal identity on this new proposal isn't sameness of body, is sameness of personality.

所以新提案中人格同一性的关键,不在于同样的肉体,而在于同样的人格。

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And it certainly looks as though if you don't believe in souls, you have to accept the body theory of personal identity.

而且很明显,如果你不信灵魂论，你就只能接受,人格同一性的肉体论了。

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As we could have same personality without literally same brain, if personality is the key to personal identity, that would still be me.

我们可以拥有同样的人格,不需要同样的大脑,如果人格是人格同一性的关键的话，那个人还是我。

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If the soul theory of personal identity were right, that would not be me.

如果真如人格同一性的灵魂论所说,那个人就不可能是我。

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So one thing that are physicalists who do not believe in souls, one thing that physicalist could say is "What's the key of personal identity? The body. Sameness of body.

物理主义学者不相信灵魂论,当被问到,人格同一性的关键是什么时,他们会回答，相同的肉体。

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But since we are only looking at enough of the problem of identity to get to the question that we really want to think about, the nature of personal identity across time, I'm not going to pursue that.

但由于我们只是,通过质的问题,来讨论,我们真正关注的问题，也就是贯穿时间的人格同一性，所以我不讨论那些。

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