供应链中的委托代理问题主要包括由事前信息不对称引起的逆向选择问题和由事后信息不对称引起的道德风险问题。
In the supply chain, the problems in agency mainly involve the adverse selection caused by ex ante information asymmetry and moral hazard caused by ex post information asymmetry.
接下来，本文主要运用定量的研究方法，对供应链管理中的供应商选择与评价、供应链中的渠道协调与激励问题、供应链中的委托—代理问题进行了研究。
The problems of suppliers' election and evaluation, channel coordination and incentive problems in supply chain and some principal-agent problems are studied mainly in the paper.
供应链企业间由于信息不对称也存在委托代理问题。
Enterprises engaged in supply chain are also faced with principal-agent problem because of information asymmetry.
针对上述问题，运用委托代理理论设计了双边道德风险下供应链企业间知识交易的正式契约及关系契约激励机制。
Aiming at the above-mentioned problem, formal contract and relational contract of knowledge trading are designed with principal-agent theory, and then the incentive effects of contracts are analyzed.
文中的最后一部分在说明国内供应链企业合作也存在逆向选择和道德风险这一普遍问题后，指出我国企业供应链合作的委托代理问题还有自身的特点。
In the last part, we analyze the adverse selection and moral hazard problem, and pointed out that Chinese enterprise's cooperation in supply chain have its own characteristics.
研究了非对称信息及委托人-代理人理论在服务供应链利益相关者合作中的运用性问题。
The Study on the Supervising and Managing for the Operators of State-owned Enterprises under the Principal-agent Theory;
研究了非对称信息及委托人-代理人理论在服务供应链利益相关者合作中的运用性问题。
The Study on the Supervising and Managing for the Operators of State-owned Enterprises under the Principal-agent Theory;
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