The chapter three researches second price discrimination when two competition manufacturers make nth-pricing with the complete static games model, gives Nash equilibrium under this condition.
第三章运用完全信息静态博弈模型研究了竞争厂商需求区间实行n段划分的二度价格歧视情形，并且给出了此情形下的纳什均衡结果。
We studied and compared the static and dynamic games of two oligarchic enterprises on second -degree price discrimination under the condition of linear demand functions.
第二，在线性需求函数条件下研究了两寡头厂商就二度价格歧视的静态与动态博弈，并作了比较；
A systematic mathematics analysis was presented on second-degree price discrimination. On the basis of quantitative analysis, we got some qualitative conclusions.
对二度价格歧视理论进行了系统的数理经济分析，在定量分析的基础上，给出了一些定性的结论。
Firstly, we studied the method and characteristics of second-degree price discrimination that was enforced by monopoly enterprise on the basis of documents available.
首先，在已有文献的基础上，补充研究了垄断厂商二度价格歧视的方法和特点。
There are three results: 1. We studied the reasonable divisional number of demands while second-degree price discrimination was enforced by two oligarchic enterprises.
其结果有三：第一，研究了两寡头厂商实施二度价格歧视时对需求量区间的分段数的合理性问题；
There are three results: 1. We studied the reasonable divisional number of demands while second-degree price discrimination was enforced by two oligarchic enterprises.
其结果有三：第一，研究了两寡头厂商实施二度价格歧视时对需求量区间的分段数的合理性问题；
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