The game between shareholders and managers will be affected by performance metrics in the incentive contract under the relationship of principal-agent.
在委托代理关系下，股东和经理人之间的博弈行为会受到激励合同中业绩评价指标的影响。
Only efficient compensation contract could produce great incentive and promote corporation performance.
有效的报酬契约才能产生强大的激励效应，促进公司业绩的提升。
Based on a basic principal-agency model, the article Analyses the trade-off between pay for performance and promotion based incentive contract, and also points out the topics for future research.
本文采用人事经济学的分析方法，以一个基本的委托代理模型为基础，研究在人力资源管理中绩效激励和晋升激励的契约特征及其局限性，探讨激励契约的发展趋势。
Applying the idea of option incentives, this paper derives three different performance-based incentive contract designs that prove effective in constraining the egoist risk-adjustment behavior.
通过应用选择权的观念推导三种不同的绩效诱因契约设计，对于抑制经理人自利性风险调整行为倾向有较好的效果。
We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a "contract substitution" effect).
公司债务的出现产生了“契约替换”效应，即经理的契约由于风险债务而产生了变化。
We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a "contract substitution" effect).
公司债务的出现产生了“契约替换”效应，即经理的契约由于风险债务而产生了变化。
应用推荐