良心是一种道德力量。
The former concerns the quantity of virtues which a moral agent possesses, and the later is related to the robustness of the virtues of moral agents.
前者与道德主体拥有美德的数量相关，后者与道德主体美德的稳固程度相关。
Although the entertainment is innocent, but should observe a moral agent in any event, cannot drill network hypothesized the opening, fabricates the false fact.
尽管娱乐无罪，但无论如何都应该遵守一个道德底线，不能钻网络虚拟性的空子，凭空捏造虚假事实。
It denies that moral rightness depends directly on anything other than consequences, such as whether the agent promised in the past to do the act now.
它否认道德的正确性直接取决于以外的任何其他后果，如代理人是否在过去做现在采取行动的承诺。
Moral risk is produced in principal and agent relationship, which results from the discordance of purpose and unequal information between principal and agent.
道德风险是在委托代理关系中产生的，其原因在于委托人和代理人努力目标不一致，信息不对等。
So what the paper wants to study is the moral hazard problem of the agent and insurance company.
因此本文要研究的是保险代理人与保险公司的道德风险问题。
For different distribution relation of power in different public sector there are various problems of moral risk of trustor and agent in various power structure.
而不同的公共部门存在着不同的权力分配关系，在不同的权力结构下，委托人与代理人可能出现的道德风险问题也会有所不同。
The overconfidence bias of the principal and agent on the would firm ' s common signal quality of increase agency cost and worsen the moral hazard problem.
委托人和代理人在公司信息方面的过度自信偏差都将提高代理成本、恶化道德风险问题。
The result of study indicate it can relieve the moral hazard both of principal and agent.
研究结果表明：在初始契约中写进解聘补偿可有效缓解委托代理双方的道德风险。
Because of information asymmetry, the personal rationality of property company and agent in real estate sale mode will lead to moral risk, and will trap them into "Prisoners' Dilemma".
在房产商和房产代理人共同组成的房产销售模式中，由于信息不对称，委托代理双方利用个人理性决策会导致道德风险，并陷入囚徒困境。
In the end, an optimal principal agent contract between non-life insurance companies and professional agent is designed to avoid professional agent's moral hazard in marketing.
为了避免专业代理人展业中的道德风险，设计了非寿险公司与专业代理人之间的最优委托代理合同。
The paper discusses that Principal-Agent of quality control between the supplier and purchaser. The paper also expatiates the resolving of adverse selection and moral hazard .
本文还对供应链环境下，上下游企业间的委托代理问题进行了研究，并阐述了对合作伙伴逆向选择问题和道德风险的解决方法。
The forecast studies focus on the insured 's moral hazard, rarely or even neglect the agent and insurance company.
然而以往的研究主要集中在投保人的道德风险问题上，很少或忽视了对保险代理人和保险公司道德风险的研究。
According to the theory of principal-agent, the shareholder should supervise the behavior of the manager in order to reduce the moral risk came from the asymmetry of information.
根据委托代理理论，为了减少因信息不对称所产生的经理人员的道德风险行为，股东需要对经理人员进行监督。
The invalidation of financial supervision which SASAC as the investor to the Solely State-owned Company mainly find expression in: first, the insider control and agent moral hazard;
国资委对国有独资公司财务监督失效的表现有，一是内部人控制及代理人的道德风险；
Next, it analyzed the moral risk as well as the guard countermeasure which the private fund faced under the information asymmetry condition from the Angle of entrust-agent relationship.
其次，从委托—代理关系的角度分析了信息不对称条件下，私募基金所面临的道德风险以及防范对策。
As there are asymmetric information and principal-agent relationship between the insurance company and insurance agent in ordinary insurance, there exists moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
一般保险中，保险公司和保险代理人之间有不对称信息和委托—代理关系，故存在道德风险和逆向选择问题。
The main thought of this article stems from principal-agent model which had been used for solving moral hazard problems because of information asymmetry between principal and agent.
本文主要思想来源于委托-代理模型，用于解决委托人与代理人由于信息不对称而引发的道德风险问题。
In the principle-agent problem with moral hazard, the observation of the state of nature has the same effect with the monitoring of agent's action.
在道德风险问题的委托代理关系中，委托人对代理人行动的监督与对自然状态的观测所起的效果是等价的。
This thesis concentrated on the principal-agent model based on moral hazard, and to better the former model on the point of customer values, and then analyzed the result, with conclusion finally.
本文着重分析道德风险下的委托代理模型，基于客户价值的角度改进原有激励模型，分析模型结果，并加以总结说明。
Based on the analysis of principal-agent problem and its structure model, this paper studied the moral hazard problem by using game theory.
在分析其委托代理问题的特点并构建结构模型的基础上，利用博弈论相关理论研究其中的道德风险问题。
Supply chain members are pursuing maximum profit and minimum cost in trust-agent relationship, which leads to converse choice and moral risk;
供应链成员在委托代理过程中追求边际效益最大化和成本最小化，容易产生逆向选择和道德风险；
Supply chain members are pursuing maximum profit and minimum cost in trust-agent relationship, which leads to converse choice and moral risk;
供应链成员在委托代理过程中追求边际效益最大化和成本最小化，容易产生逆向选择和道德风险；
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