Introduces two kinds of Cournot models under complete and incomplete information of game theory, and its extension Stackelberg model.
介绍了博弈理论的完全信息和不完全信息下的两个古诺模型，以及它的推广—斯塔克博格的寡头竞争模型。
This paper first analyzes the behavior of the controlling and non-controlling shareholders by static and dynamic game with the complete and incomplete information.
通过股权制衡的完全信息和不完全信息的静态、动态博弈分析，研究公司治理中控股股东和非控股股东的行为关系。
The system dynamics is used to make the simulation about the differential game under the condition of complete information and incomplete information.
以系统动力学为工具，通过模拟的方法求解完全信息和不完全信息情况下微分博弈的均衡策略。
Presuming a control management institute m, the dynamic stabilization model of Non-equity Strategic Alliance under conditions of complete information and incomplete information is established.
提出了稳定过程中的管理协调控制机构M的假设，分别建立了在完全信息和不完全信息条件下的非股权战略联盟相对稳定模型。
Then use the thoughts of game theory, analyzed the incomes of tripartite subject, Drawn out the complete information and incomplete information game model.
然后运用博弈论的思想，对担保三方主体的收益进行了博弈分析，得出了完全信息下和不完全信息下三方收益最大的博弈均衡解。
The dynamic stability models with complete information and incomplete information of virtual R&D alliance were put up. The administrant and negotiatory organ of virtual R&D alliance was supposed.
建立完全信息条件下和不完全信息条件下R&D虚拟联盟的动态稳定模型，对稳定过程中的管理协调机构作出假设。
The dynamic stability models with complete information and incomplete information of virtual R&D alliance were put up. The administrant and negotiatory organ of virtual R&D alliance was supposed.
建立完全信息条件下和不完全信息条件下R&D虚拟联盟的动态稳定模型，对稳定过程中的管理协调机构作出假设。
应用推荐