We know Goldman made money selling synthetic CDOs.
我们知道高盛通过卖抵押债务债券赚钱。
Opaque as CDSs may be, they are less complex than CDOs.
或许CDSs不太透明，但它们并不比CDOs复杂。
Better mortgages and CDOs are selling for 70 cents on the dollar.
更好的抵押贷款和债务抵押债券都是按70美分卖的。
CDOs often include the cheapest assets that will achieve the required rating.
信贷资产证券总是包括最廉价的资产以达到等级所需。
AIG had assumed that the insurance would be valued more highly than the CDOs.
美国国际集团假设，保险将比担保债务凭证价值更高。
We know John Paulson made $1 billion betting against mortgages using one of these CDOs.
我们知道约翰鲍尔森利用这种债务抵押债券中一种赌房贷违约赚了10亿美元。
Would Mr Greenberg, whose nose for risk was legendary, have limited the exposure to CDOs?
格林伯格对风险的预感极准已经成为传奇，如果他还在公司的话，是不是会减少债务抵押债券呢？
Take the growth of traded credit products, such as asset-backed securities and CDOs made up of them.
我们举个快速增长的上市交易信用产品的例子，诸如资产担保证券和担保债务凭证，以及由资产担保证券作为组分的担保债务凭证。
Most investors were happy to buy products such as CDOs because they trusted the value of credit ratings.
多数投资者曾很乐于购买CDO等产品，因为他们信任信用评级的价值。
Hence the decision to move into the complex business of insuring CDOs and playing a role in their construction.
于是该公司决定转而从事复杂的CDO业务，并在参与其构建工作。
And did we mention that the agencies get paid by the issuers of the CDOs to make their supposedly objective rating?
并且还有一点：债券发行者向那些评级机构缴纳费用以得到这所谓的公正的评级。
Hedge funds could short financial stocks and then bid down the prices of CDOs stuck on Wall Street's balance sheets.
对冲基金可以在股价大跌时抛光股票，然后压低华尔街资产负债表上的债务抵押债券价格。
If your models tell you that a security is safer than its returns imply, as with CDOs, that might just suggest hidden risks.
如果你的模型告诉你某一债券比其回报率所暗示的安全性要高，比如担保债权凭证，那么你就得假设其中有隐藏的风险。
Likewise, it was hard to gauge the exposures to "tail" risks built up by sellers of swaps on CDOs such as AIG and bond insurers.
同样，例如AIG和其他债券保险商所发行的CDO互换的“尾部”风险的暴露也很难估计。
At first blush, this might seem surprising.After all, during the boom years for CDOs, the two products were closely intertwined.
乍一看，这似乎有点令人吃惊，毕竟在CDO的繁荣时期，两者不相上下。
At first blush, this might seem surprising. After all, during the boom years for CDOs, the two products were closely intertwined.
乍一看，这似乎有点令人吃惊，毕竟在CDO的繁荣时期，两者不相上下。
To make matters worse, bond insurers, which rate America's $2.5 trillion municipal-bond market, are also up to their necks in CDOs.
雪上加霜的是，债券保险人也在抵押债权凭证中泥足深陷，而它们还担当着为价值25000亿美元的美国市政债券市场进行评级的重任。
The agencies have been shifting their ground, downgrading mortgage-backed bonds by the dozen and promising to keep a close eye on CDOs.
评级机构正改变立场，下调了许多抵押债券的等级，并保证密切关注债务抵押债券。
I got an offer, ironically from Linman Brothers to go work in CDOs, so it will pay six-figure salary, real job and I actually have money.
我得到了一个机会，讽刺的是来自雷曼兄弟，作为首席开发官，有六位数的薪水，真实工作，事实上我就有钱了。
At the time of the Fed intervention, the value of the CDOs insured by AIG was falling dramatically and AIG was facing a credit downgrade.
美联储当初进行干预时，这些由AIG承保的CDO正在急剧贬值，AIG也正面临着信用降级。
They protected investors from initial losses on the mortgages backing the CDOs, while offering better returns than bonds with a similar rating.
它们既可以保护投资者免遭支持抵押债权凭证的抵押贷款的初步损失，又可以提供比相同评级的债券更高的回报率。
The roasting, which lasted more than ten hours, was as dramatic as any discussion of synthetic collateralised-debt obligations (CDOs) could be.
持续了十多个小时煎熬般的听证会的算得上是所有关于合成抵押债务凭证（CDOs）的讨论中最具戏剧性的一场。
To understand why so much blame is being heaped on the rating agencies, consider how CDOs and collateralised-loan obligations (CLOs) came into vogue.
要理解为什么评级机构承受了如此多的指责，我们需要考虑CDO和CLO是如何变得风行一时的。
Meanwhile, collateralised-debt obligations (CDOs), made up of clumps of those securities and laced with leverage, have become almost impossible to trade.
与此同时，由许多有价证券板块构成的次级债贷款，本来就是有调控作用的，现在也变得无法交易。
Banks are disassembling securities produced by bundling home and commercial mortgages and repackaging them into what market experts describe as mini-CDOs.
银行开始拆开由住房和商业抵押贷款打包成的证券，然后重新打包成市场专家所谓的“迷你债权抵押证券”。
Banks are disassembling securities produced by bundling home and commercial mortgages and repackaging them into what market experts describe as mini-CDOs.
银行开始拆开由住房和商业抵押贷款打包成的证券，然后重新打包成市场专家所谓的“迷你债权抵押证券”。
应用推荐