The overconfidence bias of the principal and agent on the would firm ' s common signal quality of increase agency cost and worsen the moral hazard problem.
委托人和代理人在公司信息方面的过度自信偏差都将提高代理成本、恶化道德风险问题。
Because of the asymmetric information problem, the principal (patient) is unable and without incentive to supervise the agent 's (doctor's) activities from begiming to end.
由于信息不对称，委托人（病人）自始至终无法也没有激励机制去监督代理人（医生）行为。
Because of the asymmetric information problem, the principal (patient) is unable and without incentive to supervise the agent 's (doctor's) activities from begiming to end.
由于信息不对称，委托人（病人）自始至终无法也没有激励机制去监督代理人（医生）行为。
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