本文首先建立了基于再保险人分担理赔费用的夸大风险损失的索赔欺诈博弈模型，然后分析了保险双方的博弈策略选择及其可能达到的均衡。

Based on the incomplete dynamic game theory, a claiming fraud game model of exaggera(ting) the loss on the basis of sharing in the claim costs by the reinsures is set up.

youdao

本文首先建立了基于再保险人分担理赔费用的夸大风险损失的索赔欺诈博弈模型，然后分析了保险双方的博弈策略选择及其可能达到的均衡。

Based on the incomplete dynamic game theory, a claiming fraud game model of exaggera(ting) the loss on the basis of sharing in the claim costs by the reinsures is set up.

youdao