亚洲危机后的第三代模型将研究视角转向微观层面，形成了道德风险模型和金融恐慌模型。
As for the third-generation models, two main views were developed, namely"moral hazard-driven crisis theory"and"financial panic-driven crisis theory".
研究表明，博弈模型存在某种形式的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡，而且道德风险的存在会使保险单价格上升。
The research shows that the game model has a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the existing of moral haz.
研究表明，博弈模型存在某种形式的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡，而且道德风险的存在会使保险单价格上升。
The research shows that the game model has a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the existing of moral hazard elevates the price of insurance policy.
本文利用不完全信息动态博弈模型，探讨了金融危机、监管者的软预算约束与银行道德风险之间的关系。
Using a dynamic game model of incomplete information, this paper discusses the relations among financial crisis, regulators soft budget constraints and bankers moral hazard.
本文主要思想来源于委托-代理模型，用于解决委托人与代理人由于信息不对称而引发的道德风险问题。
The main thought of this article stems from principal-agent model which had been used for solving moral hazard problems because of information asymmetry between principal and agent.
控制权的分配是创业企业治理中的一个核心内容，文章建立了一个隐含道德风险的控制权分配模型，分析了三种控制权分配结构。
The allocation of control rights is the key of entrepreneurial governance. The paper establishes an allocation model containing moral hazard problem, and analyzes three allocation structure.
在分析其委托代理问题的特点并构建结构模型的基础上，利用博弈论相关理论研究其中的道德风险问题。
Based on the analysis of principal-agent problem and its structure model, this paper studied the moral hazard problem by using game theory.
本文将经理期权作为变量引入经理道德风险模模型，分析了它对经理道德风险程度的影响。
Executive Stock Options (ESO) is introduced into manager's moral hazard model to analyze its effects on manager's moral hazard.
然而不同金融监管制度会对金融机构的道德风险水平产生影响，通过对程序化模型进行扩展，本文对两者的关系进行了研究，并对我国金融机构监管进行了讨论。
However, different system of financial supervision will cause different moral hazards of financial institutions; and the relation is studied in this paper, through expansion of the stylized model.
如果用一个制造商和两个分销商构成的供应链模型，来研究供应链中的博弈关系、激励机制和道德风险问题。
The paper models this supply chain and studies the game relationship, incentive mechanism and moral hazard in it.
本文着重分析道德风险下的委托代理模型，基于客户价值的角度改进原有激励模型，分析模型结果，并加以总结说明。
This thesis concentrated on the principal-agent model based on moral hazard, and to better the former model on the point of customer values, and then analyzed the result, with conclusion finally.
本文着重分析道德风险下的委托代理模型，基于客户价值的角度改进原有激励模型，分析模型结果，并加以总结说明。
This thesis concentrated on the principal-agent model based on moral hazard, and to better the former model on the point of customer values, and then analyzed the result, with conclusion finally.
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