在二次拍卖中，林达尔均衡效率和非纳什均衡由内生的个人偏好所决定。
The efficient Lindahl equilibrium and the non—cooperative Nash equilibrium are determined endogenously based on the individual preferences elicited in second price auctions.
以林达尔模型和蒂布特模型的均衡条件为依据，论述了公共物品需求表达的一般模式。
To Lindahl equilibrium model and the Tiebout model based on the conditions, discussed the demand for public goods, the general pattern of expression.
以林达尔模型和蒂布特模型的均衡条件为依据，论述了公共物品需求表达的一般模式。
To Lindahl equilibrium model and the Tiebout model based on the conditions, discussed the demand for public goods, the general pattern of expression.
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