根据委托代理理论，为了减少因信息不对称所产生的经理人员的道德风险行为，股东需要对经理人员进行监督。
According to the theory of principal-agent, the shareholder should supervise the behavior of the manager in order to reduce the moral risk came from the asymmetry of information.
随着企业委托代理关系的确立，对于代理人的经营管理行为应该加以监督、约束和激励。
With the establishment of the principal-agent relationship in enterprises, the management behavior of an agent should be under supervision, control and inspiration.
由于信息不对称，委托人（病人）自始至终无法也没有激励机制去监督代理人（医生）行为。
Because of the asymmetric information problem, the principal (patient) is unable and without incentive to supervise the agent 's (doctor's) activities from begiming to end.
由于企业委托代理关系的确立，对于代理人的经营管理行为应该加以监督、约束和激励。
Because of the establishment of the relationship of authorization and agent in cooperation, the agent's management behavior should be under control, restrain and being encouraged.
风险投资基金主要有公司制和有限合伙制两种组织形式，运用委托代理理论对这两种形式的最优监督问题进行了探讨。
Venture capital funds are mainly the institution of company and the institution of limited partnership, the optimal monitoring problem is discussed by principal-agent theory.
从委托人监督代理人经营者的角度，实行外派监事会和财务总监委派制是一种切实可行的监督机制。
Considering supervising agent principal's point of view, it is a feasible supervising mechanism that an accredited system of board of supervisors and an accredited system of CFO are put into practice.
对委托人而言，代理人的监督成本很高，激励是委托—代理关系是否有效的关键因素。
For the client, supervision cost of the agents is high, and incentive pay is the key factor for the validity of commission-agency relationship.
在道德风险问题的委托代理关系中，委托人对代理人行动的监督与对自然状态的观测所起的效果是等价的。
In the principle-agent problem with moral hazard, the observation of the state of nature has the same effect with the monitoring of agent's action.
委托—代理单向治理的效果取决于监督权的完善程度和法理基础；
The effect of governance based on principal-agent is decided on the strength and the legal foundation of supervision.
运用交易成本，博弈和委托代理理论分别研究了外包项目实施过程中关于外包决策，外包商的监督以及外包商的激励问题。
The theory of transaction cost, game theory and the principal-agent theory are used to study the outsourcing decision making, monitoring and incentive compensation for the service provider.
运用交易成本，博弈和委托代理理论分别研究了外包项目实施过程中关于外包决策，外包商的监督以及外包商的激励问题。
The theory of transaction cost, game theory and the principal-agent theory are used to study the outsourcing decision making, monitoring and incentive compensation for the service provider.
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