设计合理的激励安排制度是化解这种委托代理风险的关键，其中激励机制的设计包含寿险公司对银行的激励安排和银行对银行保险销售人员的激励安排。
Well-designed incentive arrangement is the key to solving this risk. Such incentive mechanism includes both incentive to the bank by the insurer and the bank' s incentive to its sales people.
除非代理人是保兑的，否则利润和损失风险由委托人承担。
The profit and risk of loss remains within the principal, unless the agent is a del credere one.
宠物粮食召回事件突出了那些委托代理制造商生产产品的企业所面临的两个风险。
The pet-food recall highlights two risks faced by firms using contract manufacturers.
首先，文章对信息不对称、委托代理及风险投资的基础理论进行研究。
Above all, the theories of Asymmetric Information, consign - agent and Venture Capital are studied.
本文根据委托代理理论，利用风险管理决策的效用原则，分析企业管理者不同薪酬制度下的风险偏好和风险管理决策；
Base on agency theory and utility principle of risk management decision, we analysis manager's risk preference and risk management decision in different remuneration systems.
企业的委托代理问题也就是如何防范代理人的代理风险问题。
How does enterprise's request agent question also guard against agent's proxy risk question.
委托—代理理论与银行风险。
研究结果表明：在初始契约中写进解聘补偿可有效缓解委托代理双方的道德风险。
The result of study indicate it can relieve the moral hazard both of principal and agent.
道德风险是在委托代理关系中产生的，其原因在于委托人和代理人努力目标不一致，信息不对等。
Moral risk is produced in principal and agent relationship, which results from the discordance of purpose and unequal information between principal and agent.
代理协议作为约束委托人和代理人双方权利义务关系的载体，必然存在相应的风险。
There must exist relevant risk in agency agreement as a carrier which restrains right and duty of both consigner and agent.
供应链中的委托代理问题主要包括由事前信息不对称引起的逆向选择问题和由事后信息不对称引起的道德风险问题。
In the supply chain, the problems in agency mainly involve the adverse selection caused by ex ante information asymmetry and moral hazard caused by ex post information asymmetry.
针对企业不同的风险态度，用委托-代理理论建立了相应的契约机制。
This paper used the theory of principal-agency to construct an effective contract in view of firms' different attitude to risk.
其次，从委托—代理关系的角度分析了信息不对称条件下，私募基金所面临的道德风险以及防范对策。
Next, it analyzed the moral risk as well as the guard countermeasure which the private fund faced under the information asymmetry condition from the Angle of entrust-agent relationship.
中国上市公司治理存在三类相容性风险，即股东相容性风险、委托-代理的激励相容性风险和代理人能力相容性风险。
There are three compatibilities risks existing in the listed companies, namely the shareholder compatible risk, request-proxy drive compatible risk and agent ability compatible risk.
本文对风险投资委托代理链中的风险进行了分析，在此基础上详细阐述了本文提出的控制措施。
This paper analyses different risks in principle-agent chain of venture capital, offers control measures and discusses them in details.
根据委托代理理论，为了减少因信息不对称所产生的经理人员的道德风险行为，股东需要对经理人员进行监督。
According to the theory of principal-agent, the shareholder should supervise the behavior of the manager in order to reduce the moral risk came from the asymmetry of information.
在房产商和房产代理人共同组成的房产销售模式中，由于信息不对称，委托代理双方利用个人理性决策会导致道德风险，并陷入囚徒困境。
Because of information asymmetry, the personal rationality of property company and agent in real estate sale mode will lead to moral risk, and will trap them into "Prisoners' Dilemma".
而不同的公共部门存在着不同的权力分配关系，在不同的权力结构下，委托人与代理人可能出现的道德风险问题也会有所不同。
For different distribution relation of power in different public sector there are various problems of moral risk of trustor and agent in various power structure.
风险投资基金主要有公司制和有限合伙制两种组织形式，运用委托代理理论对这两种形式的最优监督问题进行了探讨。
Venture capital funds are mainly the institution of company and the institution of limited partnership, the optimal monitoring problem is discussed by principal-agent theory.
委托人和代理人在公司信息方面的过度自信偏差都将提高代理成本、恶化道德风险问题。
The overconfidence bias of the principal and agent on the would firm ' s common signal quality of increase agency cost and worsen the moral hazard problem.
风险投资基金中存在着双重委托代理关系，故委托代理理论适用于研究投资人与基金管理人之间的博弈。
There are double Principal-Agent relationship in venture capital fund, so the Principal-Agent theory is suitable for research the game between investor and found management.
作为风险投资两级委托代理关系的中枢系统，风险投资家是整个风险投资体系的核心主体和灵魂，起着非常关键的作用。
As the central system of venture capital's two principal-agents, venture capitalists are the soul of the venture capital, they play the most import role in the venture capital activity.
介绍了委托-代理机制的一般概念；分析了委托-代理机制的道德风险影响因素；
The general concept of entrustment agency mechanism was introduced and the morals risk effect factors of entrustment agency mechanism were analyzed.
如何设计一个有效的委托代理合约来减少和控制道德风险成为论文的一个研究重点。
How to design one effective agreement contract to stimulate the agency, to reduce and control Moral Hazard, becomes a focal point of research of thesis.
接下来的第三章介绍了委托代理理论的模型化方法，以及构建风险投资中投资者与风险投资家的委托代理模型；
The third part shows the way to establish themodel of principal agency and introduces the principal agency model between Venture Capitalcompany and Venture Capital person particularly.
运用博弈论中委托-代理理论对股权-债权的风险投资激励机制进行了研究。
The paper analyses systemically incentive scheme of venture capital under equity-debt by applying principal-agent theory in the game theory.
由于委托人和代理人之间的信息不对称和责任风险不一致，代理人存在损害委托人利益的动机和可能。
Because the dissymmetric information and the distinct liable risk, agent has the motive and probability to damnify the behalf of owner.
本文将运用博弈论与信息经济学理论，从合作双方的委托代理关系角度分析物流外包产生的风险。
This text will make use of the game theory and the information economics theory, from the Angle of principal-agent relationship, to analyse the risk of logistics outsourcing.
为了避免专业代理人展业中的道德风险，设计了非寿险公司与专业代理人之间的最优委托代理合同。
In the end, an optimal principal agent contract between non-life insurance companies and professional agent is designed to avoid professional agent's moral hazard in marketing.
为了避免专业代理人展业中的道德风险，设计了非寿险公司与专业代理人之间的最优委托代理合同。
In the end, an optimal principal agent contract between non-life insurance companies and professional agent is designed to avoid professional agent's moral hazard in marketing.
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