国有企业经营者激励是我国国企改革的核心问题之一。
It is one of the core problems to establish incentive mechanism of executive during our reform among the state-owned enterprises.
本文旨在研究国有企业经营者业绩评价和报酬制度的关系。
The article focus on the relationship between the performance assessment and the compensation system of managers of state-owned Enterprises.
对国有企业经营者进行有效的监督是现代企业制度的客观要求。
The modern enterprise system requires that the operators of state-owned enterprises be effectively supervised.
本文所做的研究对建立国有企业经营者监督约束机制有一定的参考价值。
The research of the paper has a certain reference value to the establishment of the supervision and restraint system.
本文旨在运用人力资本理论探讨国有企业经营者的薪酬与产权激励机制。
This article aims to discuss the salary of managers of state-owned enterprises and the property incentive mechanism by using human capital theory.
建立科学有效的国有企业经营者激励与约束机制是国企改革的客观要求。
It is the necessity to establish a scientific and efficient mechanism to encourage and constrain the managers to meet the requirement of reform within state-owned enterprises.
经营者报酬是经营者工作的动力，但是我国国有企业经营者报酬中存在着诸多问题。
The operator reward is the power which the operator works, but in our country's State-owned enterprise operator reward has many problems.
现实中，国有企业经营者利益要求的实现状况与经营者的实际利益要求之间有显著差异。
In reality, it was quite different between the realization degree of interest requirements and their actual interest requirements.
本文同时提出建立完善的国有企业经营者激励机制对完善对经营者的监管也是必不可少的。
This paper also proposes the establishment of a sound state-owned enterprise manager's incentive mechanisms to improve the operator's monitoring is also essential.
国有企业经营者的薪酬依旧主要由基本工资和年度奖金构成，长效的货币性激励几乎为零。
While the remuneration of the executive in the state-owned enterprises has composed of salaries and bonus for a long time.
国有企业经营者主要有12种利益要求，按照经营者对这些利益要求的关心程度可以划分为四个层次。
According to their concerns to the interest requirements, the 12 kinds of major interest requirements of managers in the state-owned enterprises could be divided into 4 levels.
最后，在以上理论及实证研究的基础上，提出了改进西部国有企业经营者激励机制的目标、原则及思路。
Finally, on the basis of the above theory and positive research, have put forward the countermeasure and suggestion of improving operator's incentive mechanism of western state-owned enterprise.
在分析现行国有企业经营者选择机制的弊端的基础上，从政策和法律层面探讨了产生这些弊病的主要原因。
The main drawback in the selection mechanism of state-owned enterprise's (SOE) manager and the reasons caused by policies and laws are discussed in this article.
当前，我们对国有企业经营者的选拔存在极大的风险，这种风险主要表现在对经营者能力及素质的识别上。
Today we are faced with a great risk in choosing state-owned enterprise operators. The risk is shown mainly in the judgement of an operator's ability and quality.
第三章对国有企业经营者激励现状进行了讨论。包括国有企业经营者的物质激励、精神激励、控制权激励等。
The third chapter discusses the manager incentive practice of our state-owned enterprises, which include substance incentive, spirit incentive, control incentive, and so on.
近年来，国有企业经营者与职工收入差距呈逐渐拉大趋势。国企职工工资水平低、增幅小，与社会平均工资渐行渐远。
In recent years, the gap in the income distribution of the state-owned enterprises has been enlarged, and the salary of workers and staff members is lower than social average one.
结果表明：国有企业经营者薪酬与公司绩效没有显著的正相关关系，而民营企业经营者薪酬与企业绩效有显著的正相关关系；
The result shows that the payment of operators in state-owned enterprises has no remarkable positive correlation with the firm's performance, while the pay of operators in private firms have;
重点研究转轨时期国有企业经营者的薪酬激励问题，提出对追求效益目标为主的国有企业经营者实行与相对经营业绩挂钩的报酬激励方案。
It gives a pay scheme, which relates to the relative manage achievement, to the operator of state-own firm that is mainly in pursuit of the benefit.
第一部分在理论分析和实地调查的基础上，探讨了国有企业经营者经济责任的内涵、特征，并对国有企业经营者经济责任的内容进行了论述。
Part one, based on theoretic analysis and field survey, discusses the meaning and features of economic responsibility, and states the contents of economic responsibility.
第一部分在理论分析和实地调查的基础上，探讨了国有企业经营者经济责任的内涵、特征，并对国有企业经营者经济责任的内容进行了论述。
Part one, based on theoretic analysis and field survey, discusses the meaning and features of economic responsibility, and states the contents of economic responsibility.
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