集团内部上下游子公司之间是决策有先后的动态博弈过程，利用反应函数法可以得到实力相当时两者的纳什均衡。
The relation between upriver and downriver companies is the dynamic game, by using reacting function method, we can get the Nash Equilibrium when the two companies have the equivalent strength.
对古诺均衡状态下企业竞争进行了分析，通过引入竞争对手间反应函数的概念，对横向兼并后企业运行的决策进行了研究。
By introduction of rivals reaction function the strategic decisions of mergered firms are discussed, from which some interesting conclusions are drawn.
证明了在一定的市场假设条件下，由于双寡头垄断模型中反应函数斜串介于-1与0之间，造成此模型Dournot均衡不稳定的可能。
It is shown that under a certain hypothesis of market, the slope of reaction function in duopoly model is between - 1 and 0, which leads to possible unstability for Cournot equilibrium.
证明了在一定的市场假设条件下，由于双寡头垄断模型中反应函数斜串介于-1与0之间，造成此模型Dournot均衡不稳定的可能。
It is shown that under a certain hypothesis of market, the slope of reaction function in duopoly model is between - 1 and 0, which leads to possible unstability for Cournot equilibrium.
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