在伯川德竞争假设下，研究两期保险完全分离均衡存在的充要条件。
Under the hypotheses of Bertrand competition, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the fully separating equilibrium of two-stage insurance are studied.
通过在伯川德模型利润函数中引入学习影响、溢出因子等，实现了该模型的改进和简化。
According to mend and predigest the Bertrand model, we introduce the learning effect and the Spillover into the profit function.
但在多轮博弈的模型中伯川德-施塔贝格均衡点并不稳定，最终会趋向于伯川德-纳什均衡点。
The Bertrand-Stackelberg equilibrium profit, which is not stable in the multi-round model, will eventually come close to Bertrand-Nash equilibrium profit.
首先介绍了传统的伯川德博弈模型，然后介绍了在此模型上进行了修改的在需求高涨条件下的价格竞争博弈模型。
It discusses the traditional Bertrand model and then introduces the supergame model that can be applied under the condition of boom.
在不变边际成本的同质产品伯川德价格博弈中，通常认为唯一均衡结果是各个企业获得零利润的纯战略纳什均衡。
It's commonly viewed as the only equilibrium outcome that each firm earns zero profit in the homogeneous product Bertrand game with constant marginal cost.
在不变边际成本的同质产品伯川德价格博弈中，通常认为唯一均衡结果是各个企业获得零利润的纯战略纳什均衡。
It's commonly viewed as the only equilibrium outcome that each firm earns zero profit in the homogeneous product Bertrand game with constant marginal cost.
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