An excellent example of this phenomenon may be found in the matter of limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Must Never Come

Unfortunately, Soviet efforts to constrain U.S. naval capabilities, in general, and American SLCMs, in particular, play well in certain Western quarters.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Must Never Come

Both sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs and ALCMs) should incorporate, to the extent possible, stealth technology and offer nuclear and conventional variants.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Center for Security Policy | An Assessment Of Future Requirements For US Strategic Forces And Strategic Arms Control

Among these are a number of arms control enthusiasts who are, illogical as this might seem, determined to limit SLCMs precisely because the technology involved is so difficult to control.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Must Never Come

Whatever the explanation, the ultimate purpose is clear: The Kremlin intends, if not in the present negotiations then in some future ones, to prevent the United States from fully exploiting the technological promise of SLCMs for a variety of naval missions.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Must Never Come

In fact, SLCMs permit virtually every combatant ship in the inventory to enjoy a crucial capability which once resided exclusively in the relatively small number of aircraft carriers: the ability to defend itself and to project naval power over great ranges by holding at risk enemy shipping and targets ashore.

CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Must Never Come