Estimates by The Economist suggest that 93% of restructured loans sit with public lenders.
Cumulative restructured loans are 8% of the total and are roughly equal to its capital.
Taiwan may also be understating its bad-loan numbers because it does not consider rescheduled and restructured loans as non-performing.
It looks likely that a big chunk of restructured loans will turn sour.
But bankers say the rule of thumb is that only about 15% of restructured loans eventually become bad debts (and even they need not be entirely written off).
Infrastructure loans probably make up half of restructured loans.
The government assumes that 30% of the loans are recoverable over about ten years, as enterprises are restructured or loans sold.
Within months, these loans were restructured, with a later repayment date and a lower interest rate.
Given the importance of these banks to the financial system, there was a lot of political interest in ensuring that the loans were restructured.
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Most of these loans were subsequently restructured, giving creditors about 30% of their money back.
As home prices have stabilised, unemployment has gradually declined and troubled loans have been restructured or written off, the two have set aside ever smaller provisions for loan losses.
Loans are quietly being restructured.
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The main risk is that the loans, so far merely postponed, will not be restructured.
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